David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Papers 29 (2):121-153 (2000)
Abstract We propose a metaethical view that combines the cognitivist idea that moral judgments are genuine beliefs and moral utterances express genuine assertions with the idea that such beliefs and utterances are nondescriptive in their overall content. This sort of view has not been recognized among the standard metaethical options because it is generally assumed that all genuine beliefs and assertions must have descriptive content. We challenge this assumption and thereby open up conceptual space for a new kind of metaethical view. In developing our brand of nondescriptivist cognitivism we do the following: (1) articulate a conception of belief (and assertion) that does not require the overall declarative content of beliefs (and assertions) to be descriptive content; (2) make a case for the independent plausibility of this conception of belief and assertion; and (3) argue that our view, formulated in a way that draws upon the proposed conception of belief, has significant comparative advantages over descriptivist forms of cognitivism.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Crispin Wright (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Harvard University Press.
R. M. Hare (1952). The Language of Morals. Oxford Clarendon Press.
Mark Timmons (1999). Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Mark Schroeder (2008). What is the Frege-Geach Problem? Philosophy Compass 3 (4):703-720.
Alexander Miller (2015). Rule Following, Error Theory and Eliminativism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):323-336.
Bart Streumer (2011). Are Normative Properties Descriptive Properties? Philosophical Studies 154 (3):325 - 348.
Bart Streumer (2013). Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World? Ratio 26 (4):450-470.
Mark Timmons (2003). The Limits of Moral Constructivism. Ratio 16 (4):391–423.
Similar books and articles
Josep E. Corbí (2002). The Relevance of Moral Disagreement. Some Worries About Nondescriptivist Cognitivism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):217-233.
Jeff Wisdom (2009). A Defense of Descriptive Moral Content. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):285-300.
Stephen J. Barker (2002). Troubles with Horgan and Timmons' Nondescriptivist Cognitivism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):235-255.
Brad Majors (2008). Cognitivist Expressivism and the Nature of Belief. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):279 - 293.
James Harold (2012). Cognitivism, Non-Cognitivism, and Skepticism About Folk Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):165 - 185.
David O. Brink (1999). Objectivity and Dialectical Methods in Ethics. Inquiry 42 (2):195 – 212.
Max Kölbel (2014). Agreement and Communication. Erkenntnis 79 (1):101-120.
Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2006). Moral Internalism and Moral Cognitivism in Hume's Metaethics. Synthese 152 (3):353 - 370.
Caj Strandberg (2011). The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation. Journal of Ethics 15 (4):341-369.
Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson (2009). Expressivism and Moral Certitude. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):202-215.
Gregory Salmieri & Benjamin Bayer (2013). How We Choose Our Beliefs. Philosophia (1):1-13.
Ragnar Francén (2007). Metaethical Relativism: Against the Single Analysis Assumption. Dissertation, University of Gothenburg
John Gibson (2008). Cognitivism and the Arts. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):573-589.
Bana Bashour (2013). Immoral Beliefs. Ratio 26 (3):299-309.
Added to index2010-08-24
Total downloads66 ( #64,037 of 1,796,251 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #208,698 of 1,796,251 )
How can I increase my downloads?