David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Theoria 64 (1):84-98 (2008)
W.V. Quine has expressed a fairly conventional form of non-cognitivism in those of his writings that concern the status of moral judgments. For instance, in Quine (1981), he argues that ethics, as compared with science, is ‘methodologically infirm’. The reason is that while science is responsive to observation, and therefore ‘retains some title to a correspondence theory of truth’ (p. 63), ethics lacks such responsiveness. This in turn leads Quine to contrast moral judgments with judgments that make cognitive claims (i.e., judgments that are true or false). In Quine (1986), he argues that ‘[m]oral judgments differ [...] from cognitive ones in their relation to observation’ (p. 664).
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
W. V. Quine (1992). Pursuit of Truth. Harvard University Press.
W. V. Quine (1995). From Stimulus to Science. Harvard University Press.
W. V. Quine, Robert B. Barrett & Roger F. Gibson (eds.) (1990). Perspectives on Quine. B. Blackwell.
W. V. Quine (1962). Theories and Things. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 13 (51):234-244.
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