Troubles for new wave moral semantics: The 'open question argument' revived
Philosophical Papers 21 (3):153-175 (1992)
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Chris Heathwood (2009). Moral and Epistemic Open-Question Arguments. Philosophical Books 50:83-98.
Caj Strandberg (2004). In Defence of the Open Question Argument. Journal of Ethics 8 (2):179-196.
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Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons (1992). Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived. Synthese 92 (2):221 - 260.
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Tristram McPherson (2013). Semantic Challenges to Normative Realism. Philosophy Compass 8 (2):126-136.
Mark van Roojen (2006). Knowing Enough to Disagree: A New Response to the Moral Twin Earth Argument. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies In Metaethics, Volume 1.
Andrea Viggiano (2008). Ethical Naturalism and Moral Twin Earth. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (2):213 - 224.
Heimir Geirsson (2005). Moral Twin-Earth and Semantic Moral Realism. Erkenntnis 62 (3):353 - 378.
Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons (1991). New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:447-465.
A. Paseau (2003). The Open-Endedness of the Set Concept and the Semantics of Set Theory. Synthese 135 (3):379 - 399.
John J. Tilley (2008). Reasons, Rational Requirements, and the Putative Pseudo-Question “Why Be Moral?”. Synthese 161 (2):309 - 323.
Joseph Long (2012). Right-Making and Reference. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3):277-80.
Michael Rubin (2008). Sound Intuitions on Moral Twin Earth. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):307 - 327.
Nick Zagwill (1997). Explaining Supervenience. Journal of Philosophical Research 22:509-518.
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