On (Not) Living the Good Life: Reflections on Oppression, Virtue, and Flourishing

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (sup1):2-32 (2002)
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Abstract

In this article I attempt to untangle the purported connection between moral virtue and flourishing in the context of examining what looks like an unexpected effect of oppression: If moral virtue is necessary for flourishing—as Aristotle assumes that it is when he describes eudaimonia as an “activity of the soul in accordance with virtue” — then members of structurally privileged groups can only flourish if they are morally good. However, it is hard to conceive of the privileged as morally good, since their privileges result from unjust social positionings. Thus it appears that they are prevented from leading good lives. This is an odd claim to add to a theory of oppression, which one would expect to explain how the victims of oppression — rather than its beneficiaries — are denied a shot at the good life.While the privileged may enjoy especially ample opportunities to develop certain virtues, I will be thinking here about vices associated with practices of domination, including active or passive acceptance of the benefits that come from occupying positionings that depend upon systems of male dominance, white supremacy, class divisions under capitalism, norms of heterosexuality, and so on.

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Lisa Tessman
State University of New York at Binghamton

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References found in this work

Servility and self-respect.Thomas E. Hill - 1973 - The Monist 57 (1):87 - 104.
Are 'old wives' tales' justified.Vrinda Dalmiya & Linda Alcoff - 1993 - In Linda Alcoff & Elizabeth Potter (eds.), Feminist Epistemologies. Routledge. pp. 217--244.
Does Moral Virtue Constitute a Benefit to the Agent?Brad Hooker - 1996 - In Roger Crisp (ed.), How Should one Live? Oxford University Press.
Deadly vices.Gabriele Taylor - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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