Recognition, Skepticism and Self-Consciousness in the Young Hegel
Fenomenologia E Società 32 (2):117-132 (2009)
| Abstract | The theory of recognition arises within Hegel's confrontation with epistemological skepticism and aims at responding to the questions raised by modern skepticism concerning the accessibility of the external world, of other minds, and of one's own mind. This is possible to the extent that the theory of recognition is the guiding thread of a critique of the modern foundational theory of knowledge and, at the same time, the point of departure for an alternative approach. In this article I will dwell on six stages of the evolution of Hegel's thought prior to the Phenomenology (1797-1806),stages shed great light on the direction taken by his argumentative strategy. Synthetically, the stages are as follows: 1. Hegel naturalizes the epistemological questions; 2. to do so he critiques foundationalism qua theory of empirical knowledge; 3. and qua theory of epistemic justification; 4. the critique of foundationalism is linked to a critique of the corresponding representationalistic theory of perception; 5. this, in turn, is linked to a critique of the monological theories of self-consciousness and to the development of a model of the rise of self-conscious knowing; 6. finally, Hegel synthesizes these epistemological views in a theory of knowledge qua recognition and in a metaphilosophical theory of philosophical rationality qua self-recognition: knowledge without foundation is thus the condition of possibility of philosophy’s self-justification. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Skepticism Recognition Self-Consciousness Hegel Naturalism Anti-foudationalism Jena Writings Naturalized Epistemology | |||||||||
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Italo Testa (2012). How Does Recognition Emerge From Nature? The Genesis of Consciousness in Hegel’s Jena Writings. Critical Horizons 13 (2):176-196.
Robert Sinnerbrink (2004). Recognitive Freedom: Hegel and the Problem of Recognition. Critical Horizons 5 (1):271-295.
William F. Bristow (2007). Hegel and the Transformation of Philosophical Critique. Oxford University Press.
Allegra de Laurentiis (2007). Not Hegel’s Tales: Applied Concepts, Negotiated Truths and the Reciprocity of Un-Equals in Conceptual Pragmatism. Philosophy and Social Criticism 33 (1):83-98.
Philip J. Kain (1998). Self-Consciousness, the Other and Hegel's Dialectic of Recognition: Alternative to a Postmodern Subterfuge. Philosophy and Social Criticism 24 (5):105-126.
Saul Tobias (2006). Hegel and the Politics of Recognition. Owl of Minerva 38 (1/2):101-126.
P. Canivez (2011). Pathologies of Recognition. Philosophy and Social Criticism 37 (8):851-887.
William Maker (2007). Hegel's Realism. The Owl of Minerva 39 (1-2):135-157.
Kenneth R. Westphal (2011). ‘Self-Consciousness, Anti-Cartesianism and Cognitive Semantics in Hegel’s 1807 Phenomenology’. In S. Houlgate & M. Baur (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Hegel, pp. 68–90. Blackwell.
Robert B. Brandom (2007). The Structure of Desire and Recognition: Self-Consciousness and Self-Constitution. Philosophy and Social Criticism 33 (1):127-150.
Thomas Baldwin (2009). Recognition: Personal and Political. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 8 (3):311-328.
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