Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):465-483 (2013)
|Abstract||Brentano held that every mental phenomenon has an object and is conscious (the dual relation thesis). The dual relation thesis faces a number of well-known problems. The paper explores how Brentano tried to overcome these problems. In considering Brentano's responses, the paper sheds light on Brentano's theory of judgement that underpins his philosophy of mind|
|Keywords||Brentano Inner consciousness Immediate evidence Judgement|
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