Brentano on the dual relation of the mental

Abstract
Brentano held that every mental phenomenon has an object and is conscious (the dual relation thesis). The dual relation thesis faces a number of well-known problems. The paper explores how Brentano tried to overcome these problems. In considering Brentano's responses, the paper sheds light on Brentano's theory of judgement that underpins his philosophy of mind
Keywords Brentano  Inner consciousness  Immediate evidence  Judgement
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    References found in this work BETA
    Jon Barwise (1981). Scenes and Other Situations. Journal of Philosophy 78 (7):369-397.
    Johannes Brandl, Brentano's Theory of Judgement. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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