David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind 116 (464):947-982 (2007)
Does the English demonstrative pronoun 'that' (including complex demonstratives of the form 'that F') have sense and reference? Unlike many other philosophers of language, Frege answers with a resounding 'No'. He held that the bearer of sense and reference is a so-called 'hybrid proper name' (Künne) that contains the demonstrative pronoun and specific circumstances of utterance such as glances and acts of pointing. In this paper I provide arguments for the thesis that demonstratives are hybrid proper names. After outlining why Frege held the hybrid proper name view, I will defend it against recent criticism, and argue that it is superior to views that take demonstrative pronouns to be the bearer of semantic properties
|Keywords||Demonstratives Hybrid Proper Name Frege|
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Citations of this work BETA
Mark Textor (2015). Frege’s Theory of Hybrid Proper Names Extended. Mind 124 (495):823-847.
Stefano Predelli (2012). Bare-Boned Demonstratives. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (3):547-562.
Wolfgang Künne (2010). Sense, Reference and Hybridity. Dialectica 64 (4):529-551.
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