Frege's Theory of Hybrid Proper Names Developed and Defended

Mind 116 (464):947-982 (2007)
Does the English demonstrative pronoun 'that' (including complex demonstratives of the form 'that F') have sense and reference? Unlike many other philosophers of language, Frege answers with a resounding 'No'. He held that the bearer of sense and reference is a so-called 'hybrid proper name' (Künne) that contains the demonstrative pronoun and specific circumstances of utterance such as glances and acts of pointing. In this paper I provide arguments for the thesis that demonstratives are hybrid proper names. After outlining why Frege held the hybrid proper name view, I will defend it against recent criticism, and argue that it is superior to views that take demonstrative pronouns to be the bearer of semantic properties
Keywords Demonstratives  Hybrid Proper Name  Frege
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzm947
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Stefano Predelli (2012). Bare-Boned Demonstratives. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (3):547-562.

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