David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 82 (2):255-74 (1990)
This paper argues that questions concerning the nature of concepts that are central in cognitive psychology are also important to epistemology and that there is more to conceptual change than mere belief revision. Understanding of epistemic change requires appreciation of the complex ways in which concepts are structured and organized and of how this organization can affect belief revision. Following a brief summary of the psychological functions of concepts and a discussion of some recent accounts of what concepts are, I propose a view of concepts as complex computational structures. This account suggests that conceptual change can come in varying degrees, with the most extreme consisting of fundamental conceptual reorganizations. These degrees of conceptual change are illustrated by the development of the concept of an acid
|Keywords||Belief Cognitive Psychology Concept Epistemology|
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References found in this work BETA
Alvin I. Goldman (1986). Epistemology and Cognition. Harvard University Press.
John H. Holland (1986). Induction Processes of Inference, Learning, and Discovery. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
Paul Thagard (1988). Computational Philosophy of Science. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
Keith J. Holyoak & Paul Thagard (1989). Analogical Mapping by Constraint Satisfaction. Cognitive Science 13 (3):295-355.
Citations of this work BETA
Bradley Franks (1992). Realism and Folk Psychology in the Ascription of Concepts. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):369-390.
Christopher Gauker (1993). An Extraterrestrial Perspective on Conceptual Development. Mind and Language 8 (1):105-30.
James Blachowicz (1994). Unarticulated Meaning. Erkenntnis 40 (1):43 - 70.
Paul Thagard (1991). In Defense of Computational Philosophy of Science. Minds and Machines 1 (2):217-219.
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