David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 82 (2):255-74 (1990)
This paper argues that questions concerning the nature of concepts that are central in cognitive psychology are also important to epistemology and that there is more to conceptual change than mere belief revision. Understanding of epistemic change requires appreciation of the complex ways in which concepts are structured and organized and of how this organization can affect belief revision. Following a brief summary of the psychological functions of concepts and a discussion of some recent accounts of what concepts are, I propose a view of concepts as complex computational structures. This account suggests that conceptual change can come in varying degrees, with the most extreme consisting of fundamental conceptual reorganizations. These degrees of conceptual change are illustrated by the development of the concept of an acid
|Keywords||Belief Cognitive Psychology Concept Epistemology|
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References found in this work BETA
S. L. Armstrong, L. R. Gleitman & H. Gleitman (1983). What Some Concepts Might Not Be. Cognition 13 (1):263--308.
Donald Davidson & Gilbert Harman (1970/1977). Semantics of Natural Language. Synthese 22 (1-2):1-2.
Alvin I. Goldman (1986). Epistemology and Cognition. Harvard University Press.
W. K. C. Guthrie, S. Sambursky & M. Dagut (1958). The Physical World of the Greeks. Journal of Hellenic Studies 78:160.
Ian Hacking (1975). Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy? Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Paul Thagard (1991). In Defense of Computational Philosophy of Science. Minds and Machines 1 (2):217-219.
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