David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia 19 (2-3):189-196 (1989)
This paper examines Alvin Goldman's discussion of acceptance and uncertainty in chapter 15 of his book, Epistemology and Cognition. Goldman discusses how acceptance and rejection of beliefs might be understood in terms of "winner-take-all" connectionist networks. The paper answers some of the questions he raises in his epistemic evaluation of connectionist programs. The major tool for doing this is a connectionist model of explanatory coherence judgments (Thagard, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1989). Finally, there is a discussion of problems for Goldman's general epistemological project that arise if one adopts a different approach to connectionism based on distributed representations
|Keywords||Belief Connectionism Epistemology Justification Goldman, A|
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