Coherence: The price is right

Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):42-49 (2012)
This article is a response to Elijah Millgram's argument that my characterization of coherence as constraint satisfaction is inadequate for philosophical purposes because it provides no guarantee that the most coherent theory available will be true. I argue that the constraint satisfaction account of coherence satisfies the philosophical, computational, and psychological prerequisites for the development of epistemological and ethical theories
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2011.00091.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Paul Thagard (1988). Computational Philosophy of Science. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
Patrick Maher (1993). Betting on Theories. Cambridge University Press.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Paul Thagard (1998). Ethical Coherence. Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):405 – 422.
Amalia Amaya (2007). Formal Models of Coherence and Legal Epistemology. Artificial Intelligence and Law 15 (4):429-447.
Richard Fumerton (1994). The Incoherence of Coherence Theories. Journal of Philosophical Research 19:89-102.
Laurence BonJour (1994). Fumerton on Coherence Theories. Journal of Philosophical Research 19:103-108.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

12 ( #205,927 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #289,836 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.