From the descriptive to the normative in psychology and logic

Philosophy of Science 49 (1):24-42 (1982)
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to describe a methodology for revising logical principles in the light of empirical psychological findings. Historical philosophy of science and wide reflective equilibrium in ethics are considered as providing possible models for arguing from the descriptive to the normative. Neither is adequate for the psychology/logic case, and a new model is constructed, employing criteria for evaluating inferential systems. Once we have such criteria, the notion of reflective equilibrium becomes redundant
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Citations of this work BETA
Henry E. Kyburg (1983). Rational Belief. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):231.
L. A. Whitt (1990). Atoms or Affinities? The Ambivalent Reception of Daltonian Theory. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 21 (1):57-89.

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