David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 88 (2):179 - 199 (1991)
It is argued that there can only be a small-finite number of mathematical objects; that these objects range from the very concrete to the very abstract; and that mathematics is essentially not concerned with objects but with concepts. This viewpoint is described as mentalist and is upheld over Platonism, intuitionism, and formalism.
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