The self as a system of multilevel interacting mechanisms

Philosophical Psychology (2):1-19 (2012)
This paper proposes an account of the self as a multilevel system consisting of social, individual, neural, and molecular mechanisms. It argues that the functioning of the self depends on causal relations between mechanisms operating at different levels. In place of reductionist and holistic approaches to cognitive science, I advocate a method of multilevel interacting mechanisms. This method is illustrated by showing how self-concepts operate at several different levels
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DOI 10.1080/09515089.2012.725715
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