David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
I undertake a metaphysical investigation of Saul Kripke's modern classic, Naming and Necessity . The general problem of my study may be expressed as follows: What is the metaphysical justification of the validity and existence of the pertinent classes of truths, the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori, according to the Kripke Paradigm? My approach is meant to disclose the logical and ontological principles underlying Kripke's arguments for the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori respectively. The results of my study are to a certain extent negative: They attempt to show that the classes of the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori statements cannot possibly be valid. If the general argument of this thesis is sound, then, on this ground, the realist conception of metaphysical essentialism is rejected. The positive thesis of this study is the articulation of certain ways to frame the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori which avoid the problems of realistic essentialism and which suggest a certain transcendental reading of modality. According to the Kripke Paradigm, any de dicto modal status derives ultimately from the de re modality inherent in the object designated, as the object is characterised by contingent and necessary properties on the ontological level. Thus, the Kripke Paradigm is primarily a thesis in de re realist essentialism. The final verdict in this study is that the Kripke Paradigm cannot sustain the realistic conception of de re metaphysical essentialism. If we should adopt a transcendental reading of modality, then certain portions of the Kripke Paradigm are valid. I do not delineate or possess the details of a comprehensive doctrine of transcendental metaphysic. Nevertheless, the observations I make should suffice to bring about the rough orientation of how I conceive the notion of transcendental modality
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Stephen K. McLeod (2008). Knowledge of Necessity: Logical Positivism and Kripkean Essentialism. Philosophy 83 (324):179-191.
Chen Bo (2011). Proper Names, Contingency A Priori and Necessity A Posteriori. History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (2):119 - 138.
Heimir Geirsson (1991). The Contingent a Priori: Kripke's Two Types of Examples. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (2):195 – 205.
Peter Nicholls & Dan Passell (1985). Kripke's Contingent A Priori and Necessary A Posteriori. Philosophy Research Archives 11:481-489.
Robert Stalnaker (2001). On Considering a Possible World as Actual. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (75):141-156.
Thomas Baldwin (2001). On Considering a Possible World as Actual. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):157–174.
Tuomas E. Tahko (2008). A New Definition of A Priori Knowledge: In Search of a Modal Basis. Metaphysica 9 (2):57-68.
Feng Ye (2009). A Naturalistic Interpretation of the Kripkean Modality. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (3):454-470.
Tuomas E. Tahko (2009). On the Modal Content of A Posteriori Necessities. Theoria 75 (4):344-357.
A. Casullo (2010). Knowledge and Modality. Synthese 172 (3):341 - 359.
Maria J. Frápolli (1992). Identity, Necessity and a Prioricity:The Fallacy of Equivocation. History and Philosophy of Logic 13 (1):91-109.
Manuel Perez Otero (2002). Aplicaciones Filosoficas Del Bi-Dimensionalismo. Theoria 17 (3):457-477.
Robert Hanna (1998). A Kantian Critique of Scientific Essentialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):497-528.
Christopher Hughes (2004). Kripke: Names, Necessity, and Identity. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2010-09-25
Total downloads60 ( #73,485 of 1,911,616 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #321,691 of 1,911,616 )
How can I increase my downloads?