David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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History and Philosophy of Logic 28 (1):83-100 (2007)
Exhumation and study of the 1945 paradox of confirmation brings out the defect of its formulation. In the context of quantifier conditional-probability logic it is shown that a repair can be accomplished if the truth-functional conditional used in the statement of the paradox is replaced with a connective that is appropriate to the probabilistic context. Description of the quantifier probability logic involved in the resolution of the paradox is presented in stages. Careful distinction is maintained between a formal logic language and its semantics, as the same language may be outfitted with different semantics. An acquaintance with sections 1? 5 of Hailperin (2006) covering the sentential aspects of probability logic is assumed as background information for quantifier probability logic
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