David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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This is part of a larger project that is motivated in part by linguistic considerations and by the philosophical literature in action theory and the logic of ability, but that is also meant to suggest ways in which planning formalisms could be modified to provide an account of the role of ability in planning and practical reasoning.
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