A refutation of environmental ethics

Environmental Ethics 12 (2):147-160 (1990)
An environmental ethic holds that some entities in nature or in natural states of affairs are intrinsically valuable. I argue that proposals for an environmental ethic either fail to satisfy requirements which any ethical system must satisty to be an ethic or they fail to give us reason to suppose that the values they promote are intrinsic values. If my arguments are correct, then environmental ethics is not properly ethics at all
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DOI 10.5840/enviroethics199012216
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William Grey (1993). Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (4):463 – 475.
Robin Attfield (2011). Beyond Anthropocentrism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 69:29-46.

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