David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
When I open my eyes and look at a Rubik’s cube, there is something it is like for me visually in looking at it. Various color qualities are presented to me, and they are arranged in a specific pattern. By having an experience with this particular phenomenal character I am also thereby visually representing the world outside my experience as being a certain way. If I experience a blue square to the left of a red square, the world outside my experience is represented as being one way. As I turn the cube, and come to view a green square to the left of another green square, I have an experience with a different phenomenal character. But I also come to represent the world differently. In virtue of the difference in phenomenology there is a corresponding difference in how the world is represented as being. Moreover, it seems that any two experiences with the same phenomenal character will share a certain sort of intentional content.1 If two subjects have phenomenally identical experiences, there is an important sense in which the way the world appears to them is precisely the same. I will call this intentional content that supervenes on phenomenal character “phenomenal content”. But how are we to understand this notion of “ways of appearing”? Most philosophers who have acknowledged the existence of phenomenal content have held that the way something appears to a subject is simply a matter of the properties..
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Brad J. Thompson (2009). Senses for Senses. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):99 – 117.
Brad J. Thompson (2010). The Spatial Content of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):146-184.
Brad J. Thompson (2006). Color Constancy and Russellian Representationalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):75-94.
Athanasios Raftopoulos (2008). Ambiguous Figures and Nonconceptual Content. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:179-187.
Berit Brogaard (2010). Strong Representationalism and Centered Content. Philosophical Studies 151 (3):373 - 392.
Greg Janzen (2006). The Representational Theory of Phenomenal Character: A Phenomenological Critique. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):321-339.
Diana Raffman (2008). 18 From the Looks of Things: The Explanatory Failure of Representationalism. In Edmond L. Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. Mit Press. 325.
Paul Coates (2009). The Multiple Contents of Experience. Philosophical Topics 37 (1):25-47.
Uriah Kriegel (2004). Perceptual Experience, Conscious Content, and Nonconceptual Content. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-14.
Greg Janzen (2008). Intentionalism and Change Blindness. Philosophia 36 (3):355-366.
Paul Coates, Sense-Data. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Boyd Millar (2011). Sensory Phenomenology and Perceptual Content. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):558-576.
Uriah Kriegel (2002). PANIC Theory and the Prospects for a Representational Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):55-64.
Added to index2010-12-22
Total downloads14 ( #119,025 of 1,100,097 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #304,144 of 1,100,097 )
How can I increase my downloads?