Color constancy and Russellian representationalism

Abstract
Representationalism, the view that phenomenal character supervenes on intentional content, has attracted a wide following in recent years. Most representationalists have also endorsed what I call 'standard Russellianism'. According to standard Russellianism, phenomenal content is Russellian in nature, and the properties represented by perceptual experiences are mind-independent physical properties. I argue that standard Russellianism conflicts with the everyday experience of colour constancy. Due to colour constancy, standard Russellianism is unable to simultaneously give a proper account of the phenomenal content of colour experience and do justice to its phenomenology.
Keywords Color  Constancy  Epistemology  Phenomenology  Representationalism  Russell, Bertrand
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References found in this work BETA
Austen Clark (2000). A Theory of Sentience. New York: Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Michael Madary (2012). Husserl on Perceptual Constancy. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):145-165.
Jonathan Cohen (2008). Colour Constancy as Counterfactual. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):61 – 92.
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