David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 162 (3):373 - 384 (2008)
Kolak’s arguments for the thesis ‘there is only one person’ in fact show that the subject-in-itself is not a countable entity. The paper argues for this assertion by comparing Kolak’s concept of the subject with Kant’s notion of the transcendental unity of apperception (TUAP), which is a formal feature of experience and not countable. It also argues the point by contrasting both the subject and the TUAP with the notion of the individual human being or empirical self, which is the main concern standard theories of personal identity such as those of Williams, Parfit and Nozick. Unlike the empirical self, but rather like Kant’s TUAP, the subject-in-itself cannot be counted because it is not an object or substance, despite Kolak’s thesis that there is only one. The paper also maintains that Kolak’s contention that the subject is an entity hinges on a strong and less plausible interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism.
|Keywords||Person Subject Transcendental unity of apperception Countable Transcendental idealism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Robert Nozick (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press.
Peter Singer (1993). Practical Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
Garrett Thomson (1992). The Weak, the Strong and the Mildreadings of Kant's Ontology. Ratio 5 (2):160-176.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Galen Strawson (2003). What is the Relation Between an Experience, the Subject of the Experience, and the Content of the Experience? Philosophical Issues 13 (1):279-315.
Hao Tang (2011). Transcendental Idealism in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):598-607.
Jure Zovko (2008). Metaphysics as Interpretation of Conscious Life: Some Remarks on D. Henrich's and D. Kolak's Thinking. Synthese 162 (3):425 - 438.
William Blattner (1994). Is Heidegger a Kantian Idealist? Inquiry 37 (2):185 – 201.
Jay Lombard (2008). Synchrnoic Consciousness From a Neurological Point of View: The Philosophical Foundations for Neuroethics. Synthese 162 (3):439 - 450.
Vasilis Politis (1997). The Apriority of the Starting-Point of Kant's Transcendental Epistemology. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (2):255 – 284.
Theodore Di Maria (2009). Is Kant's Theoretical Doctrine of the Self Consistent with His Thesis of Noumenal Ignorance? International Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1):25-40.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads16 ( #104,362 of 1,103,008 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #46,928 of 1,103,008 )
How can I increase my downloads?