PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:286 - 296 (1988)
|Abstract||During the last ten years John Beatty, Elisabeth Lloyd and I have argued that the semantic conception of theories is, in the context of biological theorizing, a richer conception of theory structure than the syntactic ("received view") conception. Specifically, I have argued semantic conception of theory structure better represents the structure of evolutionary theory and the relationship of this theory to phenomena. One aspect of the semantic conception that is in need of greater attention is the nature of explanation on this conception. In this paper, I argue that the semantic conception provides a richer mo accurate account of scientific explanation, in particular, of evolutionary explanations. In essence, I argue that explanation involves an appeal to numerous theories in addition to the putative explanatory theory. Employment of these theories is not formally possible in a syntactic conception but is in a semantic conception.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||No categories specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Demetris P. Portides (2005). Scientific Models and the Semantic View of Scientific Theories. Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1287-1298.
Hsiang‐Ke Chao (2005). A Misconception of the Semantic Conception of Econometrics? Journal of Economic Methodology 12 (1):125-135.
James A. T. Lancaster (2011). The Semantic Structure of Evolutionary Biology as an Argument Against Intelligent Design. Zygon 46 (1):26-46.
Cory D. Wright (2012). Mechanistic Explanation Without the Ontic Conception. European Journal of Philosophy of Science 2 (3):375-394.
John Beatty (1980). What's Wrong with the Received View of Evolutionary Theory? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:397 - 426.
Elisabeth A. Lloyd (1988). The Semantic Approach and Its Application to Evolutionary Theory. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:278 - 285.
Paul Thompson (1986). The Interaction of Theories and the Semantic Conception of Evolutionary Theory. Philosophica 37.
Mariam Thalos (1999). In Favor of Being Only Humean. Philosophical Studies 93 (3):265-298.
Christopher Menzel (1986). On the Iterative Explanation of the Paradoxes. Philosophical Studies 49 (1):37 - 61.
Arnold Cusmariu (2012). Toward a Semantic Approach in Epistemology. Logos and Episteme (4):531-543.
Frederick Suppe (2000). Understanding Scientific Theories: An Assessment of Developments, 1969-1998. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):115.
Tim Bayne (2007). Conscious States and Conscious Creatures: Explanation in the Scientific Study of Consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):1–22.
Margaret Morrison (2007). Where Have All the Theories Gone? Philosophy of Science 74 (2):195-228.
Added to index2011-05-29
Total downloads4 ( #178,748 of 549,124 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,361 of 549,124 )
How can I increase my downloads?