Environmentalism, moral responsibility, and the doctrine of doing and allowing

Ethics, Place and Environment 9 (3):269 – 278 (2006)
In 'Doing and Allowing', Samuel Scheffler argues that if a person sees herself as subject to norms of individual moral responsibility, then the content of her first-order substantive norms of individual moral responsibility must attribute greater responsibility to what one does than to what one could, but fails, to prevent. This paper is about how a morally responsible agent could deny the doctrine of doing and allowing, why an environmentalist should, and what this means for environmental ethical theory.
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DOI 10.1080/13668790600893343
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Tom Regan (2009). The Case for Animal Rights. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Noûs. Oxford University Press 425-434.
Warren Quinn (1993). Morality and Action. Cambridge University Press.

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