David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 161 (2):283 - 308 (2008)
In this paper, I lend novel support to H. P. Grice’s account of speaker meaning (GASM) by blunting the force of a significant objection. Stephen Schiffer has argued that in order to make GASM sufficient, one must add restrictions that are psychologically impossible to fulfill, thereby making GASM untenable. In what follows, I explain the elements of GASM that require it to invoke these psychologically unrealizable restrictions. I then accept Schiffer’s criticism, but modify its significance to GASM. I argue that the problem that Schiffer notes is not a reason to reject GASM, but a reason to embrace it. GASM shows that meaning is best understood as an absolute concept—an unrealizable ideal limit. Taking some inspiration from contextualist theories of knowledge attribution, I argue that my version of GASM offers a useful contextualist account of meaning attribution. Hence, pragmatic theories of meaning and communication should not wholly exclude GASM from their theorizing, at least not for the reasons that are commonly given.
|Keywords||Language Meaning Pragmatics Contextualism Communication Grice Schiffer Speaker meaning Intention based semantics|
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References found in this work BETA
Keith DeRose (1992). Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
H. P. Grice (1957). Meaning. Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388.
H. P. Grice (1969). Utterer's Meaning and Intention. Philosophical Review 78 (2):147-177.
Herbert Paul Grice (1967/1987). Logic and Conversation. In Paul Grice (ed.), Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard University Press. 41-58.
David Lewis (1979). Scorekeeping in a Language Game. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
Citations of this work BETA
Igor Douven (2012). The Lottery Paradox and the Pragmatics of Belief. Dialectica 66 (3):351-373.
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