David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):449-466 (2012)
Abstract In this paper, I examine the plausibility of Embodied Accounts of Social Cognition by finding fault with the most detailed and convincing version of such an account, as articulated by Daniel Hutto ( 2008 ). I argue that this account fails to offer a plausible ontogeny for folk psychological abilities due to its inability to address recent evidence from implicit false belief tasks that suggest a radically different timeline for the development of these abilities. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-18 DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9213-3 Authors J. Robert Thompson, Department of Philosophy and Religion, Mississippi State University, P.O. Box JS, Mississippi State, MS 39762, USA Journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Online ISSN 1572-8676 Print ISSN 1568-7759
|Keywords||Embodied cognition Theory of Mind False belief Social cognition Development|
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References found in this work BETA
Renée Baillargeon, Rose M. Scott & Zijing He (2010). False-Belief Understanding in Infants. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):110-118.
Ori Friedman & Alan M. Leslie (2007). The Conceptual Underpinnings of Pretense: Pretending is Not 'Behaving-as-If'. Cognition 105 (1):103-124.
Ori Friedman, Karen R. Neary, Corinna L. Burnstein & Alan M. Leslie (2010). Is Young Children's Recognition of Pretense Metarepresentational or Merely Behavioral? Evidence From 2- and 3-Year-Olds' Understanding of Pretend Sounds and Speech. [REVIEW] Cognition 115 (2):314-319.
Shaun Gallagher (2005). How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Tamar Gendler (2010). Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology. Oxford University Press.
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