Philosophical Investigations 20 (2):136–151 (1997)
|Abstract||I believe that Wright’s constructivist account of intention is funda- mentally ﬂawed [Wright 1984, 1986, 1987a, 1987b, 1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1991, 1992]. To understand why it fails it is necessary ﬁrst to locate the account in its broader strategic context. That context is Wright’s response to Wittgenstein’s account of rule following. When so located the diagnosis of the account’s failure is clear. Wright’s account of intention is a species of the interpretative approach to mental content which is explicitly rejected by Wittgenstein.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Robert Skipper (2004). The Heuristic Role of Sewall Wright's 1932 Adaptive Landscape Diagram. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):1176-1188.
Robert A. Skipper Jr (2004). The Heuristic Role of Sewall Wright's 1932 Adaptive Landscape Diagram. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):1176-1188.
Charles Sayward (2002). Is an Unpictorial Mathematical Platonism Possible? Journal of Philosophical Research 27:199-212.
Larry Wright (1974). Emergency Behavior. Inquiry 17 (1-4):43 – 47.
Duncan Pritchard (2001). Scepticism and Dreaming. Philosophia 28 (1-4):373-390.
Luca Moretti (2012). Wright, Okasha and Chandler on Transmission Failure. Synthese 184 (3):217-234.
Elazar Weinryb (1974). Von Wright on Historical Causation1. Inquiry 17 (1-4):327-338.
Richard Holton (1993). Intention Detecting. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (172):298-318.
Crispin Wright (1981). Rule-Following, Objectivity and the Theory of Meaning. In Steven H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule. Routledge.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads11 ( #99,523 of 549,088 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,317 of 549,088 )
How can I increase my downloads?