Representationalism and the conceivability of inverted spectra

Synthese 160 (2):203-213 (2008)
Most philosophers who have endorsed the idea that there is such a thing as phenomenal content—content that supervenes on phenomenal character—have also endorsed what I call Standard Russellianism. According to Standard Russellianism, phenomenal content is Russellian in nature, and the properties represented by perceptual experiences are mind-independent physical properties. In agreement with Sydney Shoemaker [Shoemaker, S. (1994). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54 249–314], I argue that Standard Russellianism is incompatible with the possibility of spectrum inversion without illusion. One defense of (...) Standard Russellianism is to hold that spectrum inversion without illusion is conceivable but not in fact possible. I argue that this response fails. As a consequence, either phenomenal content is not Russellian, or experiences do not represent mind-independent physical properties
Keywords Inverted spectrum  Representationalism  Phenomenal content  Color  Perception
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-006-9110-4
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Tye (2003). Consciousness, Color, and Content. Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233 - 235.
Stephen Yablo (1993). Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):1-42.

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