Online research in philosophy

The purpose of this paper is to propose a model of clinical-ethical decision making which will assist the health care professional to arrive at an ethically defensible judgment. The model highlights the integration between ethics and decision making, whereby ethics as a systematic analytic tool bring to bear the positive aspects of the decision making process. The model is composed of three major elements. The ethical component, the decision making component and the contextual component. The latter incorporates the relational aspects between the provider and the patient and the organizational structure. The model suggests that in order to arrive at an ethically, justifiable sound decision one make reference to those three elements.

Objectives for ethics education in business school courses generally appear to be based on custom, intuition, and judgment rather than on a more unified theoretical/empirical base. These objectives may be more clearly implemented and their effects studied more rigorously if they could be rooted in the components of ethical decision-making models shown to be influential in ethical decision making. This paper shows how several widely used ethics education objectives can be placed in the context of current models of ethical decision making.

This paper focuses on the construction of merit as the key selection criterion for judging. It will show how merit has been masculinised within the social script so as to militate against the acceptance of women as judges. The social construction of the feminine in terms of disorder in the public sphere fans doubts that women are appointable - certainly not in significant numbers to the most senior levels of the bench. It is argued that merit, far from being an objective criterion, operates as a rhetorical device shaped by power. The paper will draw on media representations of women judges in three recent Australian scenarios: an appointment to the High Court; the appointment of almost 50 percent women to Victorian benches; and the scapegoating of a female chief magistrate (resulting in imprisonment) in Queensland.

This study uses judgment and decision-making (JDM) perspective with the help of framing and schema literature from cognitive psychology to evaluate how managers behave when problems with unethical overtones are presented to them in a managerial frame rather than an ethical frame. In the proposed managerial model, moral judgment of the situation is one of the inputs to managerial judgment, among several other inputs regarding costs and benefits of various alternatives. Managerial judgment results in managerial intent leading to managerial action. The model and the effects of taking an ethics course on ethical and managerial judgment and managerial intent were then indirectly tested in this study, wherein subjects judged the ethical wrongness, managerial badness, and the managerial intent regarding decisions made in a case. Forty-nine MBA students analyzed a case involving budget-based bonuses and production, in which the ethical issue evolved over three stages. It appears from the Path-analysis results that managerial judgment mediated between moral judgment and the judgment of managerial intent as suggested by the proposed model, and that taking an ethics course directly affected managerial judgment but did not affect the moral judgment. Additionally, in the first stage of decision-making (early stage of a developing “ethical slippery slope”), moral judgment did not significantly influence managerial judgment. However, students with ethics course still were more inclined to judge the decision as managerially bad as compared to others, indicating that they were more aware or sensitive to the moral issues involved.

There are uses of the term merit in Indian religions which also appear in secular contexts, but in addition there are other uses that are not encountered outside religion. Transfer of merit is a specific doctrine in whose connection the term merit is used with an intention which is not the same as that found in nonreligious contexts. Two main types of transfer of merit can be distinguished. First, the transfer of merit has been associated with certain ritual practices in Hinduism and in Buddhism. Another main type of transfer of merit is connected with Mahāyāna belief in bodhisattvas' loving-kindness towards other beings. In the orthodox Hindu schools, in Hnayāna Buddhism and in Jainism, transfer of merit has been rejected on account of the doctrine of karma according to which the person can acquire karmic outcomes for only those actions he or she has performed by himself.

Nonhuman animals are widely used in psychological research and the level of suffering and death is high. This is usually said to be justified by appealing to the scientific merit of the research. This article looks at notions of scientific merit, queries whether they are as clear-cut as commonly supposed, and argues that with contemporary conceptions it is too easy for any research to count as meritorious. A tightening of the notion of scientific merit is suggested, providing a ground for rejection of certain psychological research.

Merit review of scientific projects involving laboratory animals is a central issue in the current debate over the ethics of animal experimentation. In this essay, I examine several conceptual, regulatory, and practical problems inherent in the merit review process. Contemporary challenges to the existing merit review system and suggestions for reform are also discussed. The essay concludes with comments on legal and political questions relevant to the future of merit assessment.

The tension between equity and excellence is fundamental in science policy. This tension might appear to be resolved through the use of merit-based evaluation as a criterion for research funding. This is not the case. Merit-based decision making alone is insufficient because of inequality aversion, a fundamental tendency of people to avoid extremely unequal distributions. The distribution of performance in science is extremely unequal, and no decision maker with the power to establish a distribution of public money would dare to match the level of inequality in research performance. We argue that decision makers who increase concentration of resources because they accept that research resources should be distributed according to merit probably implement less inequality than would be justified by differences in research performance. Here we show that the consequences are likely to be suppression of incentives for the very best scientists. The consequences for the performance of a national research system may be substantial. Decision makers are unaware of the issue, as they operate with distributional assumptions of normality that guide our everyday intuitions.