Philosophical Papers 34 (3):405-427 (2005)
|Abstract||This essay aims to capture the intuition that the moral person is, in virtue of being such, favored over the immoral person to lead a meaningful life. It is argued that the reason for this is that the moral person is open to affirmation from others in a way that the immoral person is not. Central to the argument is that idea of psychological health. Being affirmed by others is a fundamental aspect of being psychologically health. Thus, being moral and being psychologically healthy are said to dovetail with respect to leading a meaningful life. The argument regarding psychological health draws upon, and extends, P. F. Strawson’s seminal essay “Freedom and Resentment”. Also in this regard, Wittgenstein’s argument against the possibility of a private language is extended to social behavior generally.|
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