Making sense of sense-making: Reflections on enactive and extended mind theories

Topoi 28 (1):23-30 (2009)
Abstract
This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making . We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.
Keywords Enaction  Extended mind  Autonomy  Sense-making  Emotion  Embodiment  Incorporation
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    Julian Kiverstein (2012). The Meaning of Embodiment. Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (4):740-758.
    Richard Menary (2010). Introduction to the Special Issue on 4E Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):459-463.
    Leon de Bruin & Lena Kästner (2012). Dynamic Embodied Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):541-563.

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