Making sense of sense-making: Reflections on enactive and extended mind theories

Topoi 28 (1):23-30 (2009)
This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making . We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.
Keywords Enaction  Extended mind  Autonomy  Sense-making  Emotion  Embodiment  Incorporation
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-008-9043-2
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References found in this work BETA
Hanne De Jaegher & Ezequiel Di Paolo (2007). Participatory Sense-Making. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):485-507.

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