Topoi 28 (1):23-30 (2009)
|Abstract||This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making . We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Zoe Drayson (2010). Extended Cognition and the Metaphysics of Mind. Cognitive Systems Research 11 (4):367-377.
Thomas Fuchs & Hanne de Jaegher (2009). Enactive Intersubjectivity: Participatory Sense-Making and Mutual Incorporation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4).
Robert A. Wilson (2010). Meaning Making and the Mind of the Externalist. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Mit Press.
Marek McGann (forthcoming). Enactive Theorists Do It on Purpose: Toward an Enactive Account of Goals and Goal-Directedness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
John Protevi, Deleuze, Jonas, and Thompson Toward a New Transcendental Aesthetic and a New Question of Panpsychism.
Katsunori Miyahara (2011). Neo-Pragmatic Intentionality and Enactive Perception: A Compromise Between Extended and Enactive Minds. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):499-519.
Giovanna Colombetti (web). Enaction, Sense-Making and Emotion. In S.J. Gapenne & E. Di Paolo (eds.), Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
Ezequiel Di Paolo (2009). Extended Life. Topoi 28 (1):9-21.
Hanne De Jaegher & Ezequiel Di Paolo (2007). Participatory Sense-Making. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):485-507.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads132 ( #3,413 of 549,087 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,317 of 549,087 )
How can I increase my downloads?