Normativity

Open Court (2008)
Abstract
Goodness -- Goodness properties -- Expressivism -- Betterness relations -- Virtue/kind properties -- Correctness properties (acts) -- Correctness properties (mental states) -- Reasons-for (mental states) -- Reasons-for (acts) -- On some views about "ought" : relativism, dilemmas, means-ends -- On some views about "ought" : belief, outcomes, epistemic ought -- Directives -- Addendum 1: "Red" and "good" -- Addendum 2: Correctness -- Addendum 3: Reasons -- Addendum 4: Reasoning.
Keywords Normativity (Ethics
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Call number BJ1458.3.T46 2008
ISBN(s) 9780812696585  
DOI 10.1093/analys/anq084
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Citations of this work BETA
Benjamin Kiesewetter (forthcoming). How Reasons Are Sensitive to Available Evidence. In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press
Jonathan Way (2015). Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3).

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