Objectivity of the Concepts of Health and Disease

Analyse & Kritik 13 (1):94-100 (1991)
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Abstract

It is now widely accepted that the concepts of “health” and “disease” in psychiatric and psychological contexts are value laden. In this article I argue that even in the realm of physical illness and disease (appendicitis, phenylketonuria, etc.), the concepts of “health”, “illness” and "disease” are value laden. I explore the four most common bases used to objectively ground the key concept “normal functioning”, namely, genetic structure, evolutionary fitness, non-premature death and absence of pain. I argue that they all fail to adequately provide an objective grounding for the. concept “normal functioning” (health) and, hence, for “abnormal functioning” (illness, disease). The reason an objective grounding cannot be given is that physical “health”, “illness” and “disease” rest on widely shared values in addition to the condition of the organism.

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Some myths about 'mental illness'.Michael S. Moore - 1975 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):233 – 265.

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