Online research in philosophy

A contract theory is an attempt both to make normative sense of contract law as an institutional type and to come up with criteria for the evaluation of the law of any particular place. There is no precise rule telling us how far the prescriptions of a theory can deviate from actually existing contract law and still be a theory of contract — rather than a political proposal to replace contract law with something else. But we can say roughly that contract theory aims to provide normative foundations for the type of legal institution that enforces (some) agreements and unilateral commitments. Having provided an account of the point of having an institution of that general kind, the theory can then be used to evaluate existing examples.

The framing question of Mills' important and thought-provoking paper is whether there is reason for political progressives and radicals to employ the notion of a social contract for either descriptive or normative purposes. In contrast to the common response that the social contract is a piece of "bourgeois mystification" he argues instead that a reformulated conception of the contract, one which he calls the..

Professor Donaldson in his book Corporations and Morality has attempted to use a social contract theory to develop moral principles for regulating corporate conduct. I argue in this paper that his attempt fails in large measure because what he refers to as a social contract theory is, in fact, a weak functionalist theory which provides no independent basis for evaluating business corporations. I further argue that given the nature of a morality based on contract and the nature of the modern corporation, it is highly unlikely that any plausible contract theory of business ethics can be developed.

This article assesses the quality of Integrative Social Contracts Theory (ISCT) as a social contract argument. For this purpose, it embarks on a comparative analysis of the use of the social contract model as a theory of political authority and as a theory of social justice. Building on this comparison, it then develops four criteria for any future contractarian theory of business ethics (CBE). To apply the social contract model properly to the domain of business ethics, it should be: (1) self-disciplined, i.e., not aspire results beyond what the contract model can realistically establish; (2) argumentative, i.e., it should seek to provide principles that are demonstrative results of the contractarian method; (3) task-directed, i.e., it should be clear what the social contract thought-experiment is intended to model; and (4) domain-specific, i.e., the contractarian choice situation should be tailored to the defining problems of business ethics.

Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls set out different versions of the social contract theory. In this dissertation, these different versions are treated as iterative accounts within an on-going meta-conversation. To facilitate this conversation, a generic social contract is developed that sets out a uniform way to look at the different versions of the social contract. The generic social contract highlights specific features of the contract process for comparison by creating a set of questions that are posed to each theorist. This conversation reveals a series of progressive choices regarding the values and standards incorporated into the moral and political institutions designed to bring about social order. Taken as a whole, the different versions are subsumed under a social contract paradigm that reinterprets the social contract as a diagnostic tool that goes back and forth between assessing problematic moral and political situations and the societal institutions that manage them. The social contract paradigm offers a technique of continuous inquiry that permits renegotiation of the social contract in light of progressive refinement of the demands placed upon moral and political institutions.

Munoz-Dardé (2009) argues that a social contract theory must meet Rousseau's 'liberty condition': that, after the social contract, each 'nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before'. She claims that Rousseau's social contract does not meet this condition, for reasons that suggest that no other social contract theory could. She concludes that political philosophy should turn away from social contract theory's preoccupation with authority and obedience, and focus instead on what she calls the 'legitimacy' of social arrangements. I raise questions about each of these claims.

In The Frontiers of Justice, Martha Nussbaum argues that social contract theory cannot accommodate political duties to animals because it requires the parties to the contract to enjoy rough physical and mental equality. Her interpretation of the social contract tradi­tion is unpersuasive; social contract theory requires only that the parties be equally free and deserving of moral consideration. Moreover, social contract theory is superior to her capabilities approach in that it allows us to limit the scope of the community of justice to animals we are capable of recognizing as subjects of justice and with whom we have a political relationship.

Following a brief account of the puzzle that ethics committees present for the Western Philosophical tradition, I will examine the possibility that social contract theory can contribute to a philosophical account of these committees. Passing through classical as well as contemporary theories, particularly Rawls' recent constructivist approach, I will argue that social contract theory places severe constraints on the authority that may legitimately be granted to ethics committees. This, I conclude, speaks more about the suitability of the theory to this level of analysis than about the ethics committee phenomenon itself. Keywords: ethics committees, moral consensus, social contract theory CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?

In this reply to Professor Hodapp's criticism of my social contract theory, I focus on the misinterpretations I believe Professor Hodapp makes of the social contract tradition as well as my version of the contract. By misinterpreting the underlying purpose of social contract theory, he neglects the contract's heuristic or functional dimension, something that leads him to downplay the importance of the contract as a conceptual catalyst. And by adopting an overly narrow notion of rationality, he imagines circularity where none exists. Later, Professor Hodapp questions the effect of the contract upon individual liberties, and in doing so broaches a critical issue. But I attempt to show that his concerns are eliminated by close attention to the theory itself.

Social contract theory has a rich history. It originated among the ancients with recognition that social arrangements were not products of nature but convention. It developed through the centuries as theorists sought ethical criteria for distinguishing good conventions from bad. The search for such ethical criteria continues in recent attempts to apply social contract theory to organizations. In this paper, I question the concept ofconsent as a viable ethical criterion, and I argue for an alternate principle of impartiality as a more appropriate moral norm in a social contracttheory of organizations.