Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):169-170 (1999)
|Abstract||We address two points in this commentary. First, we question the extent to which O'Brien & Opie have established that the classical approach is unable to support a viable vehicle theory of consciousness. Second, assuming that connectionism does have the resources to support a vehicle theory, we explore how the activity of the units of a PDP network might sum together to form phenomenal experience (PE).|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Sydney Shoemaker (1991). Qualia and Consciousness. Mind 100 (399):507-24.
James John (2010). Against Qualia Theory. Philosophical Studies 147 (3).
Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (2004). Vehicle, Process, and Hybrid Theories of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):303-305.
Tomer Fekete & Shimon Edelman (2011). Towards a Computational Theory of Experience. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):807-827.
David J. Chalmers (1995). Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
Matthew Kennedy (2009). Heirs of Nothing: The Implications of Transparency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604.
Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien (1999). A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22:127-148.
Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). Putting Content Into a Vehicle Theory of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):175-196.
Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-48.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads4 ( #178,586 of 549,069 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,185 of 549,069 )
How can I increase my downloads?