Robert Adams and the Best Possible World

Faith and Philosophy 13 (2):252-259 (1996)
Abstract
Robert Merrihew Adams argues that it is permissible for a perfectly good moral agent to create a world less good than the best one she could create. He argues that God would exhibit the important virtue of grace in creating less than the best and that this virtue is incompatible with the merit considerations required by the standard of creating the best. In this paper I give three arguments for the compatibility of merit consideration and graciousness of God toward creation. I conclude that grace would not release a perfect agent from responsibility to create the best
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Robert Merrihew Adams (1972). Must God Create the Best? Philosophical Review 81 (3):317-332.
William Rowe (2002). Can God Be Free? Faith and Philosophy 19 (4):405-424.
Jesse R. Steinberg (2007). Leibniz, Creation and the Best of All Possible Worlds. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 62 (3):123 - 133.
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