David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 4 (4):307-317 (1997)
This paper examines the account offered by Bolton and Hill (1996) of how reasons can be causes, and thus how symptoms of mental disorders can be both caused and carry meaning. The central problem is to reconcile the causal and rationalizing powers of content-laden mental states. I draw out these two aspects by putting them in the context of recent work in analytical philosophy, including Davidson's token identity theory and his account of mental disorder. The latter, however, can be used to emphasize in a novel way what is becoming a familiar charge: that Davidson does not show how mental content, as opposed to the physical bearers of that content, can itself play a causal role. (edited)
|Keywords||Mind Psychopathology Reason Science Bolton, D Hill, J|
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