David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):580–609 (2003)
It is often noted that institutional objects and artifacts depend on human beliefs and intentions and so fail to meet the realist paradigm of mind-independent objects. In this paper I draw out exactly in what ways the thesis of mind-independence fails, and show that it has some surprising consequences. For the specific forms of mind-dependence involved entail that we have certain forms of epistemic privilege with regard to our own institutional and artifactual kinds, protecting us from certain possibilities of ignorance and error; they also demonstrate that not all cases of reference to these kinds can proceed along a causal model. As a result, realist views in ontology, epistemology, and semantics that were developed with natural scientific kinds in mind cannot fully apply to the everyday world. In closing I consider some wider consequences of these results for social science and philosophy.
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References found in this work BETA
Saul A. Kripke (1980). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
Hilary Putnam (1975). Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge University Press.
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge 431-433.
Citations of this work BETA
Bjørn Jespersen & Massimiliano Carrara (2011). Two Conceptions of Technical Malfunction. Theoria 77 (2):117-138.
Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2015). Three Kinds of Social Kinds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):96-112.
Nikk Effingham (2010). The Metaphysics of Groups. Philosophical Studies 149 (2):251-267.
Dan Cavedon‐Taylor (2015). Kind Properties and the Metaphysics of Perception: Towards Impure Relationalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):487-509.
Dustin Stokes (2011). Minimally Creative Thought. Metaphilosophy 42 (5):658-681.
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