Representationalism and the argument from hallucination

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):384-412 (2008)
Phenomenal character is determined by representational content, which both hallucinatory and veridical experiences can share. But in the case of veridical experience, unlike hallucination, the external objects of experience literally have the properties one is aware of in experience. The representationalist can accept the common factor assumption without having to introduce sensory intermediaries between the mind and the world, thus securing a form of direct realism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00327.x
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Brad J. Thompson (2010). The Spatial Content of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):146-184.

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