Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (2):308-310 (1998)
|Abstract||In his new commentary, Damper re-emphasises his claim that parity is not a generalisation problem. But when proper account is taken of the arguments he puts forward, we find that the proposed conclusion is not the only one that can be drawn.|
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