David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialectica 57 (2):205–223 (2003)
The challenge of handling fictional discourse is to find the best way to resolve the apparent inconsistencies in our ways of speaking about fiction. A promising approach is to take at least some such discourse to involve pretense, but does all fictional discourse involve pretense? I will argue that a better, less revisionary, solution is to take internal and fictionalizing discourse to involve pretense, while allowing that in external critical discourse, fictional names are used seriously to refer to fictional characters. I then address two objections to such realist theories of fiction: One, that they can’t adequately account for the truth of singular nonexistence claims involving fictional names, and two, that accepting that there are fictional characters to which we refer is implausible or ontologically profligate.
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References found in this work BETA
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Citations of this work BETA
Stacie Friend (2007). Fictional Characters. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):141–156.
Alex Grzankowski (2012). Not All Attitudes Are Propositional. European Journal of Philosophy (3):374-391.
Francesco Berto (2011). Modal Meinongianism and Fiction: The Best of Three Worlds. Philosophical Studies 152 (3):313-35.
Amie L. Thomasson (2008). Existence Questions. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):63 - 78.
Alex Grzankowski (2014). Attitudes Towards Objects. Noûs 49 (3):n/a-n/a.
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