The easy approach to ontology

Axiomathes 19 (1):1-15 (2009)
Abstract
This paper defends the view that ontological questions (properly understood) are easy—too easy, in fact, to be subjects of substantive and distinctively philosophical debates. They are easy, roughly, in the sense that they may be resolved straightforwardly—generally by a combination of conceptual and empirical enquiries. After briefly outlining the view and some of its virtues, I turn to examine two central lines of objection. The first is that this ‘easy’ approach is itself committed to substantive ontological views, including an implausibly permissive ontology. The second is that it, like neo-Fregean views, relies on transformation rules that are questionable on both logical and ontological grounds. Ultimately, I will argue, the easy view is not easily assailed by either of these routes, and so remains (thus far) a tenable and attractive approach.
Keywords Ontology  neo-Fregean  Metaontology  Metametaphysics  Existence
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References found in this work BETA
Matti Eklund (2006). Neo-Fregean Ontology. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):95–121.
Matti Eklund (2006). Metaontology. Philosophy Compass 1 (3):317-334.
Katherine Hawley (2007). Neo‐Fregeanism and Quantifier Variance. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):233 - 249.
Eli Hirsch (2002). Against Revisionary Ontology. Philosophical Topics 30 (1):103-127.

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