David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Axiomathes 19 (1):1-15 (2009)
This paper defends the view that ontological questions (properly understood) are easy—too easy, in fact, to be subjects of substantive and distinctively philosophical debates. They are easy, roughly, in the sense that they may be resolved straightforwardly—generally by a combination of conceptual and empirical enquiries. After briefly outlining the view and some of its virtues, I turn to examine two central lines of objection. The first is that this ‘easy’ approach is itself committed to substantive ontological views, including an implausibly permissive ontology. The second is that it, like neo-Fregean views, relies on transformation rules that are questionable on both logical and ontological grounds. Ultimately, I will argue, the easy view is not easily assailed by either of these routes, and so remains (thus far) a tenable and attractive approach.
|Keywords||Ontology neo-Fregean Metaontology Metametaphysics Existence|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
D. S. Colman (1939). (I)Easy Extracts From Vergil's Bucolics and Georgics. (2) Easy Selections From Horace's Odes. By A. M. Croft. Pp. 64 and 61. London: Harrap, 1939. Limp Cloth, 1s. 3d. Each. [REVIEW] The Classical Review 53 (5-6):215-.
Kelly Becker (2012). Basic Knowledge and Easy Understanding. Acta Analytica 27 (2):145-161.
Tim Black (2008). Solving the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):597-617.
Hamid Vahid (2007). Varieties of Easy Knowledge Inference: A Resolution. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 22 (3):223-237.
David Hodgson (1996). The Easy Problems Ain't so Easy. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):69-75.
Matti Eklund (2009). Carnap and Ontological Pluralism. In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. 130--56.
Joel I. Friedman (2005). Modal Platonism: An Easy Way to Avoid Ontological Commitment to Abstract Entities. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (3):227 - 273.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads91 ( #10,297 of 1,008,759 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #22,161 of 1,008,759 )
How can I increase my downloads?