The Genealogy of Epistemic Virtue Concepts

Philosophical Papers 37 (3):345-369 (2008)
Abstract This paper examines the treatment of thick ethical concepts in Williams's work in order to evaluate the consistency of his treatment of ethical and epistemic concepts and to assess whether the idea of a thick concept can be extended from ethics to epistemology. A virtue epistemology is described modeled on a cognitivist virtue ethics. Williams's genealogy of the virtues surrounding propositional knowledge (the virtues of ?truthfulness?) is critically evaluated. It is concluded that this genealogy is an important contribution to the project of virtue epistemology. Thick concepts must not only feature in the account but will sustain more of the marks of objectivity than their ethical counterparts. This is so even on Williams's demanding assumptions
Keywords epistemology, ETHICS, truth, virtue ethics, williams bernard
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DOI 10.1080/05568640809485226
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1979). Virtue and Reason. The Monist 62 (3):331-350.
Christopher Hookway (2003). How to Be a Virtue Epistemologist. In Linda Zagzebski & Michael DePaul (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press 183--202.

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Citations of this work BETA
Boudewijn de Bruin (2013). Epistemic Virtues in Business. Journal of Business Ethics 113 (4):583-595.

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