Undercutting defeat via reference properties of differing arity: a reply to Pust

Analysis 71 (4):662-667 (2011)
In a recent article, Joel Pust argued that direct inference based on reference properties of differing arity are incommensurable, and so direct inference cannot be used to resolve the Sleeping Beauty problem. After discussing the defects of Pust's argument, I offer reasons for thinking that direct inferences based on reference properties of differing arity are commensurable, and that we should prefer direct inferences based on logically stronger reference properties, regardless of arity
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anr099
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Paul D. Thorn (2014). Defeasible Conditionalization. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):283-302.

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