'Partial defeaters' and the epistemology of disagreement

Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):355-372 (2010)
Can known disagreement with our epistemic peers undermine or defeat the justification our beliefs enjoy? Much of the current literature argues for one of two extreme positions on this topic, either that the justification of each person's belief is (fully) defeated by the awareness of disagreement, or that no belief is defeated by this awareness. I steer a middle course and defend a principle describing when a disagreement yields a partial defeater, which results in a loss of some, but not all, of the justification of a belief. I show that the 'no defeater' view is too strong. I also offer reasons for thinking that the 'full defeater' view is similarly mistaken.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.611.x
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John Pittard (2015). Resolute Conciliationism. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):442-463.

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