Narrow memory and wide knowledge: An argument for the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge [Book Review]

Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (4):604-615 (2009)
The development of the semantic externalism in the 1970s was followed by a debate on the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. Boghossian’s memory argument is one of the most important arguments against the compatibilist view. However, some compatibilists attack Boghossian’s argument by pointing out that his understanding of memory is internalistic. Ludlow and others developed the externalist view of memory to defend the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. However, the externalist view of memory undermines the epistemic status of memory since it gives memory a burden that is too heavy for it to carry. This paper argues that only if we take the content of memory to be narrow and take that of self-knowledge to be wide and replace Cartesian self-knowledge with contextually constrained self-knowledge, can the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge be effectively defended.
Keywords externalism  self-knowledge  memory  wide content  narrow content  外在论  自我知识  记忆  宽内容  窄内容
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DOI 10.1007/s11466-009-0040-3
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Michael Tye (1998). Externalism and Memory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72 (72):77-94.

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