David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):373 – 391 (2007)
In this paper I argue that the debate between subjective and objective theories of prudential value obscures the way in which elements of both are needed for a comprehensive theory of prudential value. I suggest that we characterize these two types of theory in terms of their different aims: procedural (or subjective) theories give an account of the necessary conditions for something to count as good for a person, while substantive (or objective) theories give an account of what is good for a person, given some set of necessary conditions. Characterizing the theories in this way allows us to see their mutual compatibility. To make this case, I assume that a theory of prudential value ought to be descriptively and normatively adequate. The criterion of descriptive adequacy requires that our theory explain the subject relativity of prudential value. I characterize subject relativity in terms of justifiability to subjects and I argue that certain procedural theories are well suited to meet this criterion. The criterion of normative adequacy requires that our theory be capable of guiding action and I argue that a certain kind of substantive theory is needed to meet this requirement.
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References found in this work BETA
Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
John Rawls (2009). A Theory of Justice. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Philosophy and Rhetoric. Oxford University Press 133-135.
Rosalind Hursthouse (1999). On Virtue Ethics. Oxford University Press.
Martha Nussbaum (2001). Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Eden Lin (2014). Pluralism About Well‐Being. Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):127-154.
Jukka Varelius (2014). Is the Expiration of Intellectual Property Rights a Problem for Non-Consequentialist Theories of Intellectual Property? Res Publica 20 (4):345-357.
Sam Wren-Lewis (2014). How Successfully Can We Measure Well-Being Through Measuring Happiness? South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):417-432.
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