Virtue and practical deliberation

Philosophical Studies 111 (2):147 - 172 (2002)
The question of how to reason well is an important normative question,one which ultimately motivates some of our interest in the more abstracttopic of the principles of practical reason. It is this normative questionthat I propose to address by arguing that given the goal of an importantkind of deliberation, we will deliberate better if we develop certainvirtues. I give an account of the virtue of stability and I argue thatstability makes reasoners (of a certain sort) reason better. Further,I suggest at the end of the paper that an account of virtues thatconduce to good reasoning might go a long way toward answering someof the traditional questions about the principles ofpractical reason.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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DOI 10.2307/4321312
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John M. Doris (2009). Skepticism About Persons. Philosophical Issues 19 (1):57-91.

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