David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Studia Logica 45 (3):251 - 273 (1986)
It is well known that the manner in which a definitely descriptive term contributes to the meaning of a sentence depends on the place the term occupies in the sentence. A distinction is accordingly drawn between ordinary contexts and contexts variously termed non-referential, intensional, oblique, or opaque. The aim of the present article is to offer a general account of the phenomenon, based on transparent intensional logic. It turns out that on this approach there is no need to say (as Frege does) that descriptive terms are referentially ambiguous or to deny (as Russell does) that descriptive terms represent self-contained units of meaning. There is also no need to tolerate (as Montague does) exceptions to the Principle of Functionality. The notion of an ordinary (i.e., non-intensional) context is explicated exclusively in terms of logical structure and it is argued that two aspects of ordinariness (termed hospitality and exposure) must be distinguished.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Pavel Tichý (1979). Existence and God. Journal of Philosophy 76 (8):403-420.
Pavel Tichý (1978). De Dicto and de Re. Philosophia 8 (1):1-16.
Pavel Tichý (1978). Two Kinds of Intensional Logic. Epistemologia 1 (1):143.
Gregory Currie & Graham Oddie (1980). Changing Numbers. Theoria 46 (2-3):148-164.
Pavel Materna (1981). Question-Like and Non-Question-Like Imperative Sentences. Linguistics and Philosophy 4 (3):393 - 404.
Citations of this work BETA
Bjørn Jespersen & Marie Duží (2015). Transparent Quantification Into Hyperintensional Objectual Attitudes. Synthese 192 (3):635-677.
Bjørn Jespersen (2008). Predication and Extensionalization. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (5):479 - 499.
Bjørn Jespersen (2011). An Intensional Solution to the Bike Puzzle of Intentional Identity. Philosophia 39 (2):297-307.
Jiří Raclavský (2011). Semantic Concept of Existential Presupposition. Human Affairs 21 (3):249-261.
Similar books and articles
E. H. Alves & J. A. D. Guerzoni (1990). Extending Montague's System: A Three Valued Intensional Logic. Studia Logica 49 (1):127 - 132.
Pavel Materna (1997). Rules of Existential Quantification Into "Intensional Contexts". Studia Logica 59 (3):331-343.
Edward N. Zalta (1988). A Comparison of Two Intensional Logics. Linguistics and Philosophy 11 (1):59-89.
Douglas Odegard (1978). The Indiscernibility of Identicals and the Relativity of Identity. Philosophical Studies 33 (3):313 - 317.
Desheng Zong (2000). Studies of Intensional Contexts in Mohist Writings. Philosophy East and West 50 (2):208-228.
John G. Stevenson (1970). Chisholm on the Indiscernibility of Identicals in Belief Contexts. Philosophical Studies 21 (1-2):3 - 5.
Wolfgang Barz (2008). The Real Trouble with Intentionality. Philosophical Explorations 11 (2):79 – 92.
Ari Maunu (2002). Indiscernibility of Identicals and Substitutivity in Leibniz. History of Philosophy Quarterly 19 (4):367-380.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads30 ( #136,968 of 1,911,733 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #254,551 of 1,911,733 )
How can I increase my downloads?