The epistemology of evil possibilities

Faith and Philosophy 10 (2):181-197 (1993)
In this paper I defend the Anselmian conception of God as a necessary being who is necessarily omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good against arguments that attempt to show that we have good reason to think there are evil possible worlds in which either God does not exist or in which He lacks at least one of these attributes. I argue that the critics of Anselmianism have failed to provide any compelling reason to think such worlds are possible. The best the critic of Anselmianism can achieve is a stand-off of competing modal intuitions. I conclude by suggesting some ways of resolving such a stand-off in favor of the Anselmian view.
Keywords Evil, Possibility, God, Omnipotence, Religion, World
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DOI 10.5840/faithphil199310233
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