Philosophia Mathematica 2 (3):177-201 (1994)
|Abstract||In this paper I argue that it is more difficult to see how Godel's incompleteness theorems and related consistency proofs for formal systems are consistent with the views of formalists, mechanists and traditional intuitionists than it is to see how they are consistent with a particular form of mathematical realism. If the incompleteness theorems and consistency proofs are better explained by this form of realism then we can also see how there is room for skepticism about Church's Thesis and the claim that minds are machines.|
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