Sophia 43 (1):115-126 (2004)
|Abstract||In this essay, I respond to two criticisms of my essay, ‘On the Alleged Connection between Moral Evil and Human Freedom’. According to Yujin Nagasawa, I equivocate on the meaning of ‘moral evil.’ I respond by offering what I believe to be an unobjectionable stipulative under-standing of what counts as moral evil which is sufficient for my argument. According to Nick Trakakis, I seriously misunderstand the conception of freedom characteristic of free will theodicists. He suggests that my argument presupposes compatibilism. I respond by showing that my argument does not presuppose the denial of the capacity to have done otherwise.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Nick Trakakis (2006). A Third (Meta-)Critique. Sophia 45 (2):139-142.
Nick Trakakis & Yujin Nagasawa (2004). Skeptical Theism and Moral Skepticism : A Reply to Almeida and Oppy. Ars Disputandi 4 (4):1-1.
Bernard Freydberg (2008). Schelling's Dialogical Freedom Essay: Provocative Philosophy Then and Now. State University of New York Press.
Nick Trakakis (2004). Second Thoughts on the Alleged Failure of Free Will Theodicies. Sophia 43 (2):87-93.
Peter Coghlan & Nick Trakakis (2006). Confronting the Horror of Natural Evil: An Exchange Between Peter Coghlan and Nick Trakakis. Sophia 45 (2):5-26.
Nick Trakakis (2003). On the Alleged Failure of Free Will Theodicies: A Reply to Tierno. Sophia 42 (2):99-106.
Yujin Nagasawa (2003). Moral Evil and Human Freedom: A Reply to Tierno. Sophia 42 (2):107-111.
Joel Thomas Tierno (2001). On the Alleged Connection Between Moral Evil and Human Freedom. Sophia 40 (2):1-6.
Joel Thomas Tierno (2006). On the Alleged Connection Between Moral Evil and Human Freedom: A Response to Trakakis' Second Critique. Sophia 45 (2):131-138.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads16 ( #81,761 of 722,929 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,087 of 722,929 )
How can I increase my downloads?